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In order to satisfy the Principle of Least Privilege1 in large 
enterprises which employ Role Based Access Control 
systems a large number of roles must be defined.  Role 
management can become a demanding and complex task 
in such situations.  This paper introduces the concepts of 
Partial Access Control Permissions (Partial Permissions) 
and Partial Access Control Rights (Partial Rights) which 
enable the number of roles to be reduced and role 
management burdens to be eased. 
Partial permissions are linked permissions which are 
applied simultaneously to two or more roles.  The rights 
defined in a partial permission only become active when 
an access request triggers a sufficient number of linked 
partial permissions.  Partial permissions enable 
permissions to be given to any combination of roles.  For 
example, if a hospital patient is attended by clinicians 
with a “treating team” role and the hospital has a “doctor” 
role, a partial permission applied to the two roles is only 
triggered during an access request from a doctor who is 
on the treating team. 
Similarly, a Full Right is triggered when a complete set of 
Partial Rights are activated.  Partial rights provide a 
means for incorporating consent and authorisation into the 
access control system, as well as facilitating the 
application of general access control rules to groups of 
associated roles.. 
Keywords:  Access Control, Role Management, Access 
Rights. 
1 Introduction 
This paper describes the concepts of Partial Permissions 
and Partial Rights.  The use of these concepts can 
simplify the administration of current access control 
systems while at the same time increasing the level of 
control that can be achieved. 
                                                          
1
 Definitions of the main terms used in this paper can be found 
in Section 3.  The terms permission and privilege are used 
interchangeably and the term right could be interpreted as 
meaning an access right or an access type. 
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In short, Partial Permissions reduce the number of 
roles/groups that must be defined in a domain.  They do 
this by enabling permissions to be assigned to role/group 
intersections and subtractions in addition to single 
roles/groups. 
Current access rights, such as READ, WRITE and 
MODIFY are binary in nature in that a user either has the 
right or they don’t have the right.  Partial Rights enable 
access rights to be given to users subject to specified 
situations.  This allows much greater flexibility in 
privilege allocation as well as allowing concepts such as 
consent and authorisation to be modelled directly as 
rights.  By modelling these concepts as rights a 
mechanism is provided for their incorporation into a 
system as a part of normal practice rather than as system 
add-ons. 
The long term goal of the research focuses on the 
development of an access control model based on set 
theory, called Set Based Access Control, which defines 
subjects, rights, and objects groups as sets.  Partial 
Permissions and Partial Rights are the central 
mechanisms which facilitate the incorporation of Set 
Theory into an access control model. However, as the use 
of Partial Permissions and Partial Rights may have 
broader application than the research will consider, it is 
appropriate that the description of these concepts be dealt 
with in this concise paper. 
1.1 Concept of Roles and Benefits 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC), introduced by 
Ferraiolo & Kuhn (1992) is a well established access 
control model.  By allowing administrators to group 
privileges together in role abstractions and to allocate 
roles to users, the administrative burdens imposed by 
previous Mandatory Access Control (MAC) models is 
reduced.  The concept of assigning users to organisational 
roles is one that is intuitive, which also increases the 
administrative advantages. 
Work in the area of trust management (Li & Mitchell 
2003) has shown that the possession of an organisation 
role can be used to facilitate authorisations for accesses to 
systems of other organisations which recognise the role.  
Roles therefore can be used to enable remote 
authorisations, potentially up to a global scale. 
1.2 Role Management and Granularity 
While the possibilities of utilising roles on a large scale 
are attractive, applying RBAC to large organisations has 
already proved to be difficult.  Kern & Walhorn (2005) 
give some insights into role management in a number of 
large organisations which vary from having 150000 users 
with 50 roles at one extreme to 11500 users with 2800 
roles at the other extreme.  Role management in such 
organisations is a complex task.  If roles are to be used on 
a more global scale, the task becomes even more 
complex. 
To alleviate the administrative management burden in 
large organisations a number of role management 
mechanisms have been proposed.  Ferraiolo et al. (2003) 
describe a number of techniques including the Enterprise 
RBAC model.  Kern & Walhorn (2005) use rules to 
automate role allocation.  This approach stems from the 
Rule Based RBAC (RB-RBAC) model proposed by Al-
Kahtani & Sandhu (2002). 
Current versions of both Windows and MacIntosh 
operating systems both utilise hierarchical group 
structures.  Groups in these systems are very similar to, if 
not identical to, roles. 
Many access control models, including the Windows 
model, manage access control by the delegation of 
administrative privileges.  While these privileges may be 
given directly to individuals or to the roles/groups that 
they belong to, there is a tendency for the allocation of 
the privileges to become hard to manage and track. 
Another level of complexity is instituted in team-based 
access control models (Thomas 1997) (Georgiadis et al. 
2001) when additional team-specific roles are defined.  
Alotaiby & Chen (2004) developed a team based model 
which utilised organisational roles.  They advocate that 
this approach is better able to model real world 
organisational needs. 
A drawback of using roles is that the desire to ease 
administrative burdens can lead to the granting of roles 
which are applied too generally to users.  For example, in 
a hospital system, doctors may be given access to the 
records of all patients when they are allocated the role of 
doctor.  This single role makes management easier, but 
the Principle of Least Privilege, which states that access 
privileges should only be given if they are needed, is 
violated.  In order to obtain access control granularity 
which satisfies the Principle of Least Privilege RBAC 
requires more specific roles.  These specific roles tend to 
be more transitory and dynamic in nature which increases 
the administrative burden significantly. 
1.3 Set Theory 
Set Theory is an area of mathematics which has been 
around for well over a century.  While a set is simply a 
collection of things of a particular kind, a set can also be 
defined by a rule or predicate which all elements must 
satisfy. 
This paper proposes that roles/groups should be treated as 
sets of users who satisfy a certain rule.  In the same way, 
system objects are also described with sets.  Rules of Set 
Theory can then be used to describe interactions between 
associated roles and associated object groups. 
Set theory has been used as the basis for a number of 
computing mechanisms.  For example, Dovier et al  
(2000) incorporate set theory in their studies into 
handling constraints in logic programming.  In the area of 
access control, Chen & Sandhu (1996) use set theory 
notation to describe their RBAC model.  Li & Mitchell 
(2002) discuss the usefulness of using the intersection of 
roles.  They also define new operators to facilitate 
authorisations from multiple individuals in different roles.  
Mechanisms like this provide a means to easily solve 
problems such as separation of duties where different 
users with defined roles are required to authorise actions. 
If sets A and B are considered, there are three binary set 
operations that are of interest (see Figure 1).  They are the 
union of A and B (A U B), which contains all the 
elements present in both A and B; the intersection of A 
and B (A ∩ B), which contains all the elements of A that 
are also present in B, and the relative compliment of B in 
A (A – B), which contains all the elements of A which 
are not present in B. 
Figure 1: Binary Set Operations 
1.4 Efficient Storage and Processing 
Many attributes, such as name or address, are relatively 
unique and not relevant to access control decisions.  
These attributes can be described as independent 
attributes.  There are other attributes, however, such as 
role or location, which are generally collective in nature 
and are relevant to access control decisions.  These 
attributes can be described as dependent attributes. 
It is common to store attributes associated with users in 
some form of user profile.  This type of storage could be 
termed user-based storage.  Another approach is to list 
users who have a particular attribute in some abstraction 
of the attribute.  This type of storage could be termed 
attribute-based storage.  For example, on the one hand, 
all users who are doctors could have an attribute in their 
user profile which indicates that they hold the role of 
doctor (user-based storage) or a list of all doctors could 
be stored in the system (attribute-based storage). 
The advantage of user-based storage is that it is easy to 
retrieve all the attributes of individual users.  The 
advantage of attribute-based storage is that all users who 
have a particular attribute can easily be found. 
In order to efficiently determine which dependent 
attributes, such as roles or group memberships, a user 
holds, it is advisable to employ user-base storage.  In 
contrast, to make use of set operations it is more efficient 
to use attribute-based storage for dependent attributes.  A 
set can be used to group users who hold particular 
dependent attributes.  For example, sets can be used to 
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hold users who hold a particular role.  They can also be 
used to hold other information, such as the users who 
work in a particular location or the users are responsible 
for a particular client. 
Where memory is cheap and speed of processing is 
paramount it is advantageous to incorporate a dual-
storage method which uses both user-based and attribute-
based storage.  This enables efficient establishment of 
role/group membership and the use of role/group 
intersections and subtractions (relative compliments).  
The end result of employing a dual storage approach is 
that it allows privileges to be processed in an efficient 
manner when Partial Permissions and Partial Rights are 
utilised.    
1.5 Outline of contents 
The next section describes aspects of set theory that are 
relevant to the access control mechanisms proposed in 
this paper.  Section 3 contains definitions that are used in 
the following two sections which explain Partial 
Permissions and Partial rights.  These sections describe 
the details of the access control mechanisms. 
Examples relating to a hospital access control system are 
employed to relate the use of these mechanisms to a real 
situation.  The dynamic, volatile and complex nature of 
hospital access control systems makes them a good test 
domain for the application of access control models. 
Section 6 of the paper discusses the uses of the proposed 
mechanisms.  Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions and 
outlines further work. 
2 Set Interactions 
This paper proposes that roles or groups can be modelled 
as sets and that set operations can be used to both 
increase the granularity of privilege assignment and to 
reduce the number of roles that need to be defined. 
2.1 Access Requests 
To determine whether or not an access should be allowed, 
an access control system must check to see if the user 
making the request is entitled to the type of access 
required (defined by an access right) with regard to the 
object to which access is sought.  In other words, the 
system checks a (subject, right, object) access triple to 
determine if the subject holds the required right on the 
object. 
To maximise the use of set operations they can be applied 
to all three components of access triples.  That is, subjects 
can be grouped into sets, rights can be described by sets, 
and objects can be grouped into sets.  While it is ideal to 
apply set operations to all three components, it is also 
possible to apply them just to one or two of the 
components.  This may be necessary if an implementation 
must be designed to fit into an existing framework such 
as RBAC. 
2.2 Subject Sets 
Subjects can be grouped into sets and set operations can 
be used to allow privileges to be given to set unions, 
intersections and relative compliments.  In this sense the 
sets represent roles.  Figures 2-4 show examples of how 
set operations can be applied to subjects. 
Inheritance of roles is modelled by defining subsets.  For 
example, in Figure 3 a “Surgeon” set could be a subset of 
the “Doctor” set, allowing “Surgeons on the Treating 
Team” to be represented.  As Surgeons are also Doctors, 
they would also be represented in “Doctors on the 
Treating Team”.  Non-Surgical Doctors could be 
represented by set subtraction. 
 Figure 2: Subject/Role Union 
 Figure 3: Subject/Role Intersection 
 Figure 4: Subject/Role Subtraction 
Figure 4 shows an example where a set is used to stop a 
certain type of access – internet access in this case.  
Placing staff in this category could be a punishment for 
system misuse or conversely it may be required that 
certain roles are not allowed to have internet access to 
certain types of records. 
2.3 Right Sets 
In a system there are a finite number of rights which may 
appear in access triples.  For each of these rights a set of 
rights which satisfy the access requirements can be 
defined. 
If, for example, possession of the rights MODIFY (M) 
and APPEND (A) equate to the possession of the right 
WRITE (W) then the following rights set can be defined 
for WRITE:   
WRITE = {M∩A, W} 
This means that when processing a request for WRITE 
access to an object, the system can grant access if the user 
possesses either both the M and A rights or the single W 
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A B 
Role B = 
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Role A = 
Medical Staff 
 
A U B = Medical & Admin Staff 
right.  Similarly, the rights set for each of the other 
possible rights can be defined. 
2.4 Object Sets 
Objects can be grouped into sets and set operations can be 
used to allow privileges to be given to set unions, 
intersections and relative compliments.  Objects sets 
represent object groupings such as directories or folders, 
but an object may belong to multiple object sets. 
Figures 5-7 show examples of how set operations can be 
applied to objects. 
Figure 5: Object Group Union 
 Figure 6: Object Group Intersection 
 Figure 7: Object Group Subtraction 
As is normally the case, folders can be subsets of other 
folders.  For example, in Figure 6 “Pharmaceutical 
Records” would be a subset of “Medical Records”. 
Subsets can also be used to define different levels of 
record sensitivity or security classification.  For example, 
in Figure 7 a number of subsets of sensitive records could 
be defined such as “Very Sensitive” or “Personal”.  It 
follows that Set-Based Access Control can incorporate 
Access Levels, as described in the Bell-La Padula model 
(Bell & LaPadula 1976). 
3 Definitions 
This section details the definitions that are used in this 
paper.  All the definitions are new, with the exception of 
the definitions for Access Type and Access Right, which 
are from existing glossary sources. 
Partial Permissions (PPs) - Privileges that exist in sets 
of two or more.  In accordance with the following 
definitions, Partial Privileges can be represented in the 
form: (PID,PAN,AQ,Right/ PR). 
partial Permission set ID (PID) - An identifier 
associated with each Partial Privilege set. 
partial Permission Activation Number (PAN) – An 
integer which shows the number of Partial Privileges 
required to activate the privilege. 
Access Qualifier (AQ) - Specifies how the system treats 
an access right (for example, permit (p), deny (d), audit, 
alert etc). More complex qualifiers could be defined.      
eg alarm = deny + audit + alert. 
Access Type - The nature of an access right to a 
particular object or object group (for example, read, 
write, execute, append, modify, delete, or create). 
Derived from (CSIS). 
Access Right (Right/Full Right) - A granted permission/ 
privilege for a Subject to carry out an Access Type. 
(CSIS)  In this paper Rights are denoted by uppercase 
letters. eg READ (R). 
Partial Rights (PRs) - Rights that exist in sets of two or 
more with rules that specify how they constitute a Full 
Right.  In this paper Partial Rights are denoted by lower-
case letters.  eg consent (c) + write(w) = WRITE (W). 
Figure 8 shows the diagrammatic representation of Partial 
Permissions used in this paper.  The letters x and y 
represent the PIDs, 2 and 3 are the PANs, p and d are the 
AQs, and W and c are examples of a Right and a Partial 
Right respectively. 
 Figure 8: Partial Permission Diagrammatic 
Representation 
4 Partial Permissions 
The concept of Partial Permissions is basically to split up 
a normal permission into parts and apply the parts to 
separate roles/groups.  If an access request then brings all 
the required parts together the permission is applied in the 
normal way.  The purpose of doing this is to reduce the 
need to create extra roles/groups as well as to provide 
greater flexibility in the application of permissions. 
Partial Permissions used in combination with Partial 
Rights can be used to define general access control rules 
for a system.  These general permissions are discussed in 
Section 5.  For simplicity, this section deals with specific 
permissions which utilise Partial Permission without 
Partial Rights.  The processing of Partial Permissions is 
the same regardless for whether or not Partial Rights are 
present. 
4.1 Assigning Permissions to Sets 
An access control mechanism which utilises set 
operations can apply privileges to sets in the same way 
that privileges are assigned to roles.  In other words, each 
set would have zero or more privileges assigned to it.  
Now, in addition to applying privileges to a single set, the 
aim is to enable privileges to be applied to the unions, 
intersections, or relative compliments of sets. 
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In the case of union, it is obvious that applying a privilege 
to the union of two sets is effectively the same as 
applying the privilege to the two sets individually.  In the 
case of intersection, a privilege must be applied to both 
sets, but must be activated only when the user/object is an 
element in both sets.  In the case of set subtraction, a 
privilege again must be applied to both sets, although one 
will be a positive (permit) privilege and the other will be 
a negative (deny) privilege.  Table 1 details the different 
privilege allocation requirements. 
 
Operation Method of Allocation 
A U B Apply a permit privilege to A & to 
B individually 
A ∩ B Apply a permit privilege to A & an 
associated permit privilege to B 
A  - B Apply a permit privilege to A & an 
associated deny privilege to B 
Table 1: Privilege Allocation 
The concept of associating privileges is a new concept.  
Associations are required so that the privileges are only 
activated when the specified combination of sets are 
present, not every time one of the sets is present. 
So far only binary set operations have been described.  
Set Theory shows that binary set operations can be 
extended to form operations which apply to multiple sets.  
With multiple sets, to activate a normal full permission a 
certain number of associated partial permissions must be 
present.  In other words, a full permission can be made up 
of a bag of partial permissions.  The partial permissions 
in a bag may be identical in cases of set intersection or 
opposing in cases of set subtraction.  
4.2 Specific Permissions 
Partial Permissions which contain only full rights are 
used to define specific access requirements.  For example, 
if Doctors on Patient A’s Treating Team are to be given 
WRITE access to Patient A’s Medical Records, then an 
identical partial permission containing the W right is 
assigned to each of the four sets involved (see Figure 9). 
 Figure 9: Specific Permissions Example #1 
The example shown in Figures 9 utilises set intersection 
while that in Figure 10 shows set subtraction as well. 
In figure 10 the “deny” privilege given to set B is specific 
to the permission in question.  This means that members 
of set B do not get “WRITE” access to the records by this 
set of Partial Permissions.  It is still possible that they 
may gain access to the records through some other 
permission.  This specific denial is enabled due to the fact 
that the PID (x) of both Partial Permissions is identical.  
If a more general denial were required then the “deny” 
privilege could be specified separately.  This example 
illustrates the fine level of control that can be achieved 
through the use of Partial Permissions. 
Figure 10: Specific Permissions Example #2 
4.3 Ability to Create Specific Override Rules 
The following section describes how general permissions 
can be created.  General permissions are broad in their 
application and do not just refer to single specific 
permissions.  In practical situations it is advisable to use 
general permissions to facilitate accesses which are 
standard in nature while employing specific permissions 
to override or compliment the general permissions. 
4.4 Processing Partial Permissions 
Partial Permissions are assigned to sets in the same way 
that normal permissions are assigned to roles/groups.  
They are also processed in the same way.  For the sake of 
brevity, only an overview of the processing mechanism is 
given here. 
When an access request is processed, all the permissions 
and Partial Permissions associated with any of the 
subject’s sets or the object’s sets are collected.  Each 
Partial Permission with the same PID is counted to see if 
the number present meets the total required by the PAN 
contained in each Partial Permission.  If the number 
reaches the PAN then the Partial Permission becomes a 
normal Full Permission.  If not, they are ignored. 
C D 
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The speed of processing is proportional to the total 
number of permissions and Partial Permissions present.  
As there is no searching required there is no excessive 
overhead.  When compared to access control methods 
which require that contexts or constraints have to be 
checked, Partial Permissions may indeed be faster to 
process.  When compared to rule-based solutions, there 
are no complex functions to be evaluated, so again Partial 
Permissions would normally be faster. 
5 Partial Rights 
Access rights or Full Rights are the READ, WRITE, 
APPEND… rights that are in common use.  These rights 
are absolute in their nature.  A subject either has the right 
or does not have the right.  They are generally given once 
and thereafter always apply. 
In contrast, the concept of Partial Rights (PRs - see 
definition in Section 3) implies that rights are not 
absolute.  PRs allow rights to be given subject to a 
number of constraints being fulfilled.  Single PRs can be 
given to individuals or groups/roles.  Each PR does not, 
by itself, allow any access.  In the context of PRs, Full 
Rights can be thought of as consisting of one or more sets 
of partial rights.  For example, the Full Right to “READ” 
may be activated by the possession of both the “consent” 
and the “read” Partial Rights.  The feature of interest is 
that each of the Partial Rights can be associated with 
different groups/roles and that Full Rights are only 
activated when the subject is a member of the all the 
required groups/roles. 
While a Full Right can be attained by the possession of 
all the required PRs, Full Rights can still be granted 
directly in the normal way.  Partial Rights are an 
extension of the normal mechanism which allow more 
flexible and meaningful access requirements to be 
specified.  They do not replace normal Full Rights, they 
merely supplement them. 
The following example shows how Partial and Full 
Rights work together.  The Partial Rights consent (c), 
read (r), modify (m), and append (a) can be defined, 
along with the rights READ (R), MODIFY (M), 
APPEND (A), and WRITE (W).  If (i) consent is required 
to READ and APPEND, (ii) READ is required to 
MODIFY, and (iii) MODIFY and APPEND are required 
to WRITE, then the following right sets can be defined: 
READ = {c∩r, R, M, W}, 
MODIFY = {R∩m, M, W}, 
APPEND = {c∩a, A, W}, and 
WRITE = {M∩A, W}. 
These sets imply, for example, that a user who wishes to 
READ an object must possess either both the c and r 
Partial Rights or one of the R, M or W Full Rights on the 
object.  They also imply that a user with WRITE access 
to an object also has READ, MODIFY and APPEND 
rights to the object, as “W” appears in each rights set. 
5.1 Consent and Authorisation Rights 
Partial Rights allow abstract concepts such as consent and 
authorisation to be built into a system at the base level of 
the systems rights.  For example, consent can be 
represented as a Partial Right.  This allows general 
consent permissions to be given to subjects which are 
only activated when the subjects also possess other 
concrete (read, write…) permissions.  This approach to 
consent works because consent can be given broadly, say 
to all clinicians in a hospital who may look after a patient, 
without access being directly given to all clinicians. 
Authorisation is another key concept which can be 
modelled through Partial Rights.  Many business 
processes require that users be authorised by one or more 
other users before making an access or carrying out a 
task.  Partial Rights provide a mechanism for 
authorisations to be sought and given to the system. They 
may be sought or given at any time – either before, at the 
time of, or after they are needed or requested.  Once a 
user possesses the required authorisations within the 
system, access is allowed. 
5.2 General Permissions 
In order to alleviate the need to define specific access 
requirements when they are needed, Partial Rights are 
used.  Two or more sets of Partial Permissions containing 
Partial Rights are applied independently.  They then 
interact to form a general rule.  Figure 11 shows an 
example of how a general permission can be applied. 
In Figure 11, there are two sets of Partial Permissions.  
The first set defines the permission for doctors to write to 
medical records and only needs to be applied once to the 
“Doctor” and “”Medical Record” sets.  The second set 
defines that the patient has consented for members of 
their individual treating team to access their records.  
Each time a patient is admitted to the hospital consent is 
obtained (it may be implied) for their carers as a whole to 
have access to their records. 
Figure 11: General Permissions 
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The effect of the two sets of Partial Permissions is firstly, 
to restrict access by clinicians to patients in their care, 
and secondly, to restrict access to the patients’ records 
according to the clinician’s organisational role(s).  For 
example, doctors can write medical records only, while 
administrators can write to admin records only.  
While the second set of Partial Permissions need to be 
applied for each patient they can be applied automatically 
to sets that are based on a template.  Standard Partial 
Permissions can therefore be automatically assigned to a 
default treating team which is created for the patient on 
their admission to the hospital. 
6 Use of Partial Permissions and Rights 
While Partial Permissions can be used together with 
Partial Rights, the two concepts are also independent.  
Partial Permissions are used to enable permissions to be 
assigned to subject and/or object group intersections and 
subtractions, simplifying role/group management. Partial 
Rights, on the other hand, are used to enable rights to be 
conferred in flexible ways which more closely model 
real-world procedures for things such as consent and 
authorisation. 
6.1 Partial Permissions Reduce Role Numbers 
In order to meet security needs in RBAC based models it 
is usually necessary to define fine grained roles which 
meet specific requirements.  Where role intersections 
could be used these models need to either define a new 
role to represent each role intersection, or else define a 
number of finer grained roles to cover the various 
requirements. 
Partial Permissions, which enable the use of set 
intersection and subtraction operations, reduce the need 
for these additional roles to be created.  As fewer roles 
are necessary, role management overheads are reduced. 
6.2 Granularity of Access Control 
Many computer security experts point out that the users 
of a system pose a significant security threat.  For 
example Schneier (2000) states that “People often 
represent the weakest link in the security chain and are 
chronically responsible for the failure of security 
systems”.  The need to develop systems that meet the 
Principle of Least Privilege is therefore great. 
From a security point of view both the specific and 
general permission mechanisms meet the requirements of 
the Principle of Least Privilege.  They therefore provide 
the highest level of protection possible.  The level of 
security attained practically however, will also depend on 
the efficiency of the group management mechanism. 
6.3 Easy Management with General Rules 
General permissions can be set up very easily and require 
no ongoing administration except the management of 
team memberships.  Team management can be highly 
automated and utilise workflow operations, but that 
subject is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The concepts of set intersection and subtraction are easy 
to understand.  For example, the idea of “Doctors on a 
Treating Team” is conceptually simple.  It is therefore 
possible to build a system which utilises these 
characteristics in a way where administrators can easily 
define the rules that are required. 
6.4 Consent and Authorisation Mechanisms 
The ability to quantify concepts such as consent and 
authorisation by building them the heart of the access 
control system is very important.  By creating Partial 
Rights which model the concepts, and having these rights 
resident in the system’s set of rights, the concepts can no 
longer be thought of as mere add-ons to the system. 
It is common for there to be much talk about consent, in 
particular, but there are few, if any, examples of it being 
incorporated as a standard system component.  While 
mechanisms exist for system administrator and their 
surrogates to facilitate authorisations there are few 
systems which allow authorisations to be made without 
the need to pass administrative privileges to general 
system users.  A notable exception to this is the Li & 
Mitchell’s Role-Based Trust Management Framework (Li 
& Mitchell 2003). 
6.5 Processing Partial Rights 
While there are overheads incurred in the processing of 
Partial Rights, these are not significant.  When Partial 
Rights are present, it is merely just a matter of checking 
to see whether a combination of the Partial Rights present 
constitute a Full Right.  This can be done by checking the 
relevant Rights Set for the particular Right that the access 
request contains. 
6.6 Incorporation into Existing Systems 
Partial Permissions and Partial Rights do not invalidate 
existing permissions and access rights, they merely add 
levels of flexibility and control.  As such, they can be 
added to existing systems without making them 
redundant.  Partial Permissions can easily be applied to 
roles in RBAC systems. Partial Rights can supplement 
existing system rights with the addition of a simple partial 
rights processing facility. 
While it is feasible that Partial Rights and Permissions 
may be useful at the operating system level, they don’t 
necessarily have to be utilised at that level.  Systems such 
as Oracle DBMS build in access control mechanisms at 
the application level.  There is no reason why Partial 
Permissions and Partial Privileges cannot also be utilised 
at the application level. 
6.7 Scope of Set Based Access Control 
The scope of Set Based Access Control is somewhat 
wider than that of Role Based Access Control as it 
envisages the organisation of objects and not just users 
and privileges.  Even though this is the case, Partial 
Permissions and Partial Rights can still fit into the RBAC 
framework.  In other words, Partial Permissions and 
Partial Rights can be applied to subjects and rights 
through roles without the need to utilise set operations on 
objects. 
7 Conclusion and Further Work 
Partial Permissions provide a means for reducing the 
number of roles or groups necessary in a domain.  They 
achieve this by allowing permissions to be applied to 
role/group intersections and subtractions in addition to 
single roles/groups.  The concepts of these two set 
operations are intuitive, which leads to the easy 
formulation of required access control rules in practical 
implementations. 
Partial Rights can be used with or without Partial 
Permissions.  They increase the flexibility with which 
rights can be applied.  Instead of rights being binary in 
nature, in that they are either present or absent, Partial 
Rights allow rights to be activated when specified 
role/group memberships are present.  Partial Rights 
provide a mechanism for allowing “consent” and 
“authorisation” rights to be built into systems at the core 
level rather than as add-ons. 
Future work includes the completion of a Set-Based 
Access Control model which utilises both Partial 
Permissions and Partial Rights.  The model will provide 
options for implementing consent as well as mechanisms 
which allow authorisations to be given prior to, at the 
time of, and after an access is required.  Implementation 
of the model in the health domain will be considered. 
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